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Abstract
In this paper we study how the coexistence of access regulations for legacy (copper)
and fiber networks shapes the incentives to invest in network infrastructure. To this
end, we develop a theoretical model explaining investment incentives by incumbent
telecom operators and heterogeneous entrants and test its main predictions using
panel data from 27 EU member states over the last decade. Our theoretical model
extends the existing literature by, among other things, allowing for heterogeneous
entrants in internet access markets, as we consider both other telecom and cable
TV operators as entrants. In the empirical part, we use a novel data set including
information on physical fiber network investments, legacy network access regula-
tion and recently imposed fiber access regulations. Our main finding is that more
stringent access regulations for both the legacy and the fiber networks harm invest-
ments by incumbent telecom operators, but, in line with our theoretical model, do
not affect cable TV operators.
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1. Introduction
Next Generation Access (NGA) networks are based, in part or entirely, on fibre-optic
technologies that provide radically improved quality in terms of high-speed broadband
Internet access for residential or business customers. In view of their generic all-IP
technology and enormous bandwidth capacities, these new internet access networks rep-
resent a general purpose technology and are expected to induce significant productivity
improvements and growth across major economic sectors (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg,
1995), over and above the impact of existing telecommunications networks (see e.g. Röller
and Waverman, 2001; Czernich et al., 2011).1
Even though some European Union (EU) member states do particularly well in terms
of NGA deployment, Europe overall lags behind a number of non-European nations, in-
cluding Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the United States (FTTH Council Europe, 2015; Yoo,
2014; OECD, 2013; Briglauer and Gugler, 2013). Accordingly, the European Commission
aims to strengthen the competitiveness of Europe’s economy with an explicit focus on
digital communications technologies. In light of this, the European Commissions’ Digi-
tal Agenda Europe strategy, which is one of the seven flagship initiatives under Europe
2020, specified ambitious NGA deployment targets already in 2010 (European Commis-
sion, 2010).
Whereas the economic importance of new internet access infrastructure is widely rec-
ognized, there are various approaches to promoting the deployment of NGA networks via
competition, sector-specific regulation and public subsidies. Currently, the EU regula-
tory framework imposes rather comprehensive and strict access obligations on incumbent
operators compared to jurisdictions in the US or leading East-Asian fiber nations. Fur-
ther, the EU’s access obligations cover not only legacy (copper-based), but also NGA
(fiber-based) infrastructures.
In this paper, we shed light on how the existence of parallel regulations for copper
and NGA infrastructures shapes the incentives to invest for the two main types of NGA
network owners: incumbent telecom and cable TV operators. These operators, which own
decades-old legacy networks and enjoy substantial cost advantages over telecom entrants
in terms of NGA infrastructure deloyment, jointly account for 85.8% of the EU’s NGA
1Ahlfeldt et al. (2017) show that even the most immediate benefit of enabling fast broadband internet
access manifesting through increased property prices outweights the cost in urban and some sub-urban
areas of England.
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lines in 2014, the last year of our data set.
Our theoretical model extends the existing literature on transition from old to new
network infrastructures (Bourreau, Cambini and Dogan, 2012, 2014; Inderst and Peitz,
2012) by, most importantly, allowing for heterogenous entrants to internet access mar-
kets. In particular, our model accomodates both cable operators, which have different
footprints across EU member states, and telecom entrants, which have followed different
NGA investment patterns to cable operators. We further extend the literature on transi-
tion from copper to fiber by considering an asymmetric NGA regulation regime, in which
only the incumbent firm’s fiber infrastructure is ex ante regulated. These extensions
allow us to derive testible predictions and policy implications, which fit the differential
competition conditions across the EU’s internet access markets, in particular with respect
to cable operators, which lead the NGA deployment in many EU member states.
Our empirical tests of these predictions complement existing evidence on the effect
of access regulation on infrastruture investment (e.g. Grajek, Röller, 2012; Nardotto et
al., 2015; Bourreau et al., 2017). We use a novel panel data set on incumbent telecom
operators and cable operators from 27 EU member states over the last decade. The
advantage of our data set is that it includes information on physical NGA network in-
vestments rather than less direct accounting measures used in other studies. We also use
direct measures of regulation–the mandated access price to the legacy infrastructure and
the presence of mandated access to the NGA infrastructure–rather than regulation-aided
market outcomes, such as the number of unbundled lines. Moreover, to the best of our
knowledge, the joint impact of these coexisting regulations on investment incentives has
not yet been empirically studied.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the relevant
regulations and the theoretical and empircal work most closely related to ours. Section 3
develops an analytical model to analyze the effects of legacy and NGA regulations on
investments in fiber networks. Section 4 provides some stylized facts about the European
NGA market and empirically tests the predictions of our analytical model using data
from the EU member states. The final section 5 concludes.
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2. Transition from copper to fiber: EU’s regulations
and related literature
Within the EU markets for electronic communications networks and services have been
regulated according to the 2002 eCommunications framework.2 Among its main provi-
sions is the mandated sharing of network infrastructure, which allows entrants to com-
pete with incumbent operators, mostly successors of state-owned monopolies owners of
copper-based (legacy) communications networks. The most relevant mandated sharing
provisions are know as local loop unbundling (LLU) and specify, among other things,
more technical access conditions and the access price that an entrant must pay to the
network/local loop owner.
The eCommunications regulatory framework was initially designed for the copper-
based networks of incumbent operators, but has been extended to cover the fiber-based
NGA networks. In particular, the directives of the eCommunications framework have
been supplemented by European Commission recommendations on regulated and non-
discriminatory access to NGA networks (European Commission, 2010; European Com-
mission, 2013) to form the relevant EU regulatory framework for the emerging NGA
infrastructure.
The experience of countries leading in NGA deployment shows that fibre-based in-
frastructures do not immediately replace the existing copper or cable legacy networks
and that during a transition phase these different infrastructures co-exist. The incentives
to invest in NGA infrastructures will therefore not only be influenced by the terms of
mandated access to the NGA networks, but also to the legacy copper networks.3
The existing economic literature provides theoretical models and some empirical ev-
idence on the effect of access regulation on the deployment of new infrastructure. In a
similar setup to ours, Bourreau, Cambini and Dogan (2012) and Inderst and Peitz (2012)
show that depending on the market demand characteristics the mandated access to the
copper network may have positive or negative impact on the incumbent operator’s invst-
ment in fiber networks. These models also predict that higher access fees unambiguously
2For an overview of the relevant directives, regulations and recommendations of the EU reg-
ulatory framework, the reader is referred to the Commission’s website available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3Al24216a. The framework directive (European
Commission 2002a) and the access directive (European Commission 2002b) are of particular relevance
for sector-specific ex ante access obligations asymmetrically imposed on dominant operators.
3In the remaining part of the text, we use the terms NGA network and fiber network interchangeably.
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incentivize the entrants to invest in NGA. Bourreau Cambini and Dogan (2014) extend
these models to the presence of access regulation to fibre networks and find that it dilutes
the incentive to invest. This strand of literature assumes, however, that entrants use the
copper network managed by the incumbent operator to compete in the downstream mar-
ket for internet services provision. We additionally consider cable operators, which can
provide internet services via own legacy cable TV infrastructure and, indeed, have led
the NGA infrastructure deployment in the EU.
The early empirical literature on telecom infrastructure investment and access reg-
ulation is comprehensively surveyed in Cambini and Jiang (2009). They conclude that
the literature by and large finds that the LLU, as implemented by many national regu-
lators, discourages both incumbent and alternative telecom operators from investing in
communications networks.4
More recently, a number of studies investigated the role of access regulation, and
LLU price in particular, for the investments in NGA networks (e.g., Bacache et al.,
2014; Briglauer, 2015). These papers generally find a negative impact of regulation on
investment, but by using more aggregated data than ours, are not able investigate the
impact of LLU and fiber regulations separately on incumbent telecom operators and
cable operators. Nardotto, Valletti and Verboven (2015) use a very detailed data set
from the UK and find that LLU entry has a positive impact on the quality of the internet
service provided by telecom entrants. Also, Bourreau et al. (2017) find that local market
presence of entrants using LLU positively influence fiber networks deployment in French
metropolitan municipalities. Since these studies use data from a single country, however,
they cannot assess the effects of the stringency of LLU regulation, as measured by LLU
price for instance, on the quality of service or fiber networks deployment.
Most closely related to our empirical analysis is the work by Grajek and Röller (2012),
who also use data from EU countries and investigate the relationship between access
regulation for legacy networks and total investment in the telecommunications industry.
They find that access regulation negatively affects both total industry and individual
operators’ investments, but focus on the telecom entrants and incumbents, thus missing
the cable operators, which have proven to be very important for NGA deployment in
the EU. Moreover, in this paper, we utilize a better measure of infrastructure investment
4Briglauer et al. (2015) provide a recent comprehensive overview of the regulatory approaches and
the economic literature related to NGA deployment.
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than Grajek and Röller (2012): physical NGA lines, and derive testable hypotheses from
an analytical model. Finally, neither of the above cited studies use two separate measures
of regulation, one applied to legacy infrastructure and one to NGA infrastructure.
3. A model of investment in NGA networks
We develop a model of investment in new technologies that complements and extends the
Bourreau et al. (2012; BCD hereafter) model in multiple ways. The aim of our extension
is to account for a number of stylized facts about the European NGA infrastructure invest-
ment patterns and dominant regulatory approaches, as well as derive testable hypotheses
about the role of access regulations for NGA investments. We empirically evaluate these
hypotheses in section 4.
Most importantly, we account for heterogeneous internet access market entrants,
which are present in many European markets. To this end, we consider the presence
of three (rather than two, as in the original BCD model) different competitors: an in-
cumbent telecom operator that owns a legacy copper-based telephone network, a cable
operator that owns a legacy cable TV network, and a telecom entrant that does not own
any legacy network. The first two firms provide internet services using their respective
legacy networks; the third one relies on mandated access to the incumbent operator’s
legacy network. The competition between these three players reveals new effects that
have not been previously identified and points to even more complex impacts of regu-
lated access to legacy networks on the incentives to invest in new network infrastructures.
Moreover, we further extend our model by: i) allowing cable operator’s legacy net-
work to only partially cover the market, ii) allowing the incumbent operator’s fiber in-
frastructure to be ex ante regulated (asymmetric NGA regulation), and iii) allowing for
differences in investment costs faced by incumbent and cable operators. These extensions
address arguably the most important stylized facts about NGA infrastructure investment
in Europe, as discussed in section 4.3.
3.1 Main model structure
We consider a country as composed of a continuum of areas with a total size of z. The
fixed cost of deploying the NGA (i.e. fiber) network varies across areas, which we order
(from 0 to z) to reflect the investment costs (from the cheapest to the most expensive).
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Three firms compete in the market: a fixed telecom incumbent operator (firm 1) manages
a legacy copper network and leases it at a regulated access price (a ≥ 0); a cable entrant
(firm 2) owns a legacy cable TV network; a telecom entrant (firm 3) does not own any
legacy network and seeks access to the incumbent firm’s legacy network at the regulated
price a.
A new fiber-based network, the NGA network, allows the firms to provide higher
quality internet access, but it requires investment. In our main model (i.e. the benchmark
model in section 3.2 and the extensions thereof in sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5), we impose
the condition that the telecom entrant is passive, that is it does not invest in fiber
infrastructure. In other words, all three firms compete at the retail level, but only the
incumbent and the cable operators invest in the fiber infrastructure.5 In this case, for
each firm i = 1, 2, the decision to invest in fiber involves setting the areas [0, zi] in which
its fiber network will be rolled out, with [0, zi] ⊂ [0, z].
The fixed cost of covering an area at a given location x ∈ [0, z] is denoted by c (x),
with c (x) > 0 and c′ (x) > 0, implying that the total cost of covering the area [0, zi] for
firm i is then C (zi) =
zi∫
0
c (x) dx, with C ′ (zi) = c (zi) > 0 and C ′′ (zi) = c′ (zi) > 0. To
simplify the analysis, but without any loss of generality, we assume that C (zi) = z
2
i
2 and
C ′ (zi) = c (zi) = zi. Finally, we assume that all firms have the same marginal (wholesale
and retail) costs in all areas, which we normalize to zero.
In each area z, we use the superscripts “O” and “N” for the old/legacy (copper or
cable) and new (fiber) networks, respectively. The profit of firm i = 1, 2, 3 in a given area,
gross of investment cost, is denoted by pik,l,ji (.), where k, l, j = O,N refer to the network
infrastructure of the incumbent operator (k), the cable entrant (l) and the telecom entrant
(j), respectively. The telecom entrant is assumed to be passive, i.e. it does not invest in
fiber (i.e. z3 = 0) and relies on the access to the incumbent operator’s legacy network
instead (i.e. j = O).
We make the following key assumptions regarding the ordering of profits and the
expected impact of the access charge a:
Assumption 1 For k = O,N , pik,O,O1 (.) ≥ pik,N,O1 (.), and piO,k,O2 (.) ≥ piN,k,O2 (.).
5This is realistic in Europe, where incumbent and cable operators invest by far the most in the new
fiber based infrastructures. We relax this assumption in the Appendix and show that it does not alter
the testable hypotheses derived from the main model.
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This assumption implies that, given its network infrastructure, firm i, i = 1, 2, makes
more profit when the rival uses the old rather than the new network.
Assumption 2 For k, l = O,N, pik,l,Oi (.) > 0, i = 1, 2, 3.
This assumption implies that the old and the new network can profitably coexist in
any given area.
Assumption 3 For k, l = O,N , we have: (i) dpik,l,O1 (a) /da ≥ 0, for all a ≤ âk;
(ii) dpik,l,O3 (a) /da ≤ 0, for all a ≤ âk;(iii) dpik,l,O2 (a) /da ≥ 0, for all a ≤ âk.
Assumption 3(i) implies that regardless of its network infrastructure, the incumbent’s
profit increases with the access price a up to a certain threshold âk, which corresponds to
the monopoly access price. This is because, when a is low, an increase in a both increases
the incumbent operator’s wholesale revenues (a direct effect) and softens the competition
between the incumbent operator and the telecom entrant (a strategic effect). When a is
high enough, increasing it further reduces wholesale revenues and may therefore decrease
the incumbent’s profit.
Assumption 3(ii) implies that when the telecom entrant relies on the old network
managed by the incumbent, its profit decreases with the access price, a.
Assumption 3(iii) is related to the behaviour of the cable entrant, which never seeks
access to the incumbent operator’s legacy network, because it either invests in own fiber
network or uses its own legacy network. An increase in the access price a creates, however,
a cost disadvantage at the retail level for the telecom entrant and, indirectly, a cost
advantage for the cable entrant, which then competes less vigorously and increases its
profit. This implies that the profit function of the cable entrant is positively influenced
by the access price a.
The timing. The timing of the game is as follows: The regulator sets the access
price on the copper network, a (and on the fiber network, a˜ if the fiber network is also
regulated). Then, the incumbent and the cable operators simultaneously decide on the
areas in which to roll-out their fiber networks, z1 and z2, respectively (if the telecom
entrant is active, it also decides on z3). Finally, all three firms compete in the provision
of internet services at the retail level.
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3.2 The benchmark case
We start by studying a benchmark case, in which access to the fiber network is not
mandated. Moreover, we consider the case in which the telecom entrant is passive, i.e.
does not invest in the fiber network; however, the telecom entrant competes at the retail
level thanks to the mandated access to the incumbent operator’s legacy infrastructure.
Thus, depending on the decisions of the investment-active firms and the access price set
by the regulator, the competitive environment in any given geographical area is defined
by one of the following three regimes:
1. Infrastructure-based competition between existing legacy networks (i.e., the copper
and the cable network).6 In this case none of the firms invests in fiber and the
profits are piO,O,Oi (a), i = 1, 2, 3.
2. Infrastructure-based competition between the legacy (copper or cable) network and
the fiber network. This can happen under two different scenarios: (i) the incumbent
operator uses its copper network, while the cable entrant deploys a fiber network;
the firms obtain the gross profits piO,N,Oi (a), i = 1, 2, 3; and (ii) the incumbent
operator deploys a fiber network, while the cable entrant relies on the old cable TV
network; the firms obtain the gross profits piN,O,Oi (a), i = 1, 2, 3.
3. Infrastructure-based competition between the fiber networks. Both the incumbent
and the cable operators deploy their own fiber networks, while the telecom entrant
still continues to use mandated access to the old netwrok; the gross profits are thus
piN,N,Oi (a), i = 1, 2, 3.
Depending on the incumbent operator’s coverage [0, z1] and its own coverage [0, z2],
the cable entrant’s profit is:
Π2 (z1, z2) = −z
2
2
2 +

z2pi
N,N,O
2 (a) + (z1 − z2) piN,O,O2 (a) + (z − z1) piO,O,O2 (a)
if z2 ≤ z1
z1pi
N,N,O
2 (a) + (z2 − z1) piO,N,O2 (a) + (z − z2)piO,O,O2 (a)
if z2 > z1
.
6In case the basic broadband connections using the copper and the cable networks lead to different
service quality, the profit of the incumbent operator, the cable entrant and the telecom entrant may
differ. In what follows, we assume that the quality of connections in both legacy networks is the same.
In section 3.5, however, we allow for the asymmetry across firms in terms of the infrastructure deployment
costs.
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In order to determine the optimal investment of the cable entrant, first consider the
case in which it covers an area where the telecom incumbent operator has already rolled
out its NGA network (i.e., z2 ≤ z1). It is profitable for the cable entrant to invest in
its own NGA network in the area z2 ∈ [0, z1] if the additional gross profit it earns by
investing is higher than the investment cost in this area, that is, if
piN,N,O2 (a)− piN,O,O2 (a) ≥ z2. (1)
A similar reasoning applies when the cable entrant considers covering an area z2 ,
where the incumbent operator has not rolled-out its NGA network (i.e., z2 > z1 ). It is
profitable for the cable entrant to invest in this area if
piO,N,O2 (a)− piO,O,O2 (a) ≥ z2. (2)
Let zc2 and zm2 be defined as the highest value of z2 that satisfies inequalities (1) and (2),
respectively. We thus have zc2 =
(
piN,N,O2 (a)− piN,O,O2 (a)
)
and zm2 =
(
piO,N,O2 (a)− piO,O,O2 (a)
)
.
In each respective case, zc2 and zm2 represent the largest area in which the cable entrant
invests.
Assume that firm 2 (i.e. the cable entrant) has covered the areas [0, z2]. Firm 1’s (i.e.
telecom incumbent operator’s) profit is given by
Π1 (z1, z2) = −z
2
1
2 +

z1pi
N,N,O
1 (a) + (z2 − z1) piO,N,O1 (a) + (z − z2) piO,O,O1 (a)
if z1 ≤ z2
z2pi
N,N,O
1 (a) + (z1 − z2) piN,O,O1 (a) + (z − z1) piO,O,O1 (a)
if z1 > z2
. (3)
In order to determine firm 1’s optimal investment, first consider the case where firm
1 covers an area where firm 2 has already rolled out a fiber network (i.e., z1 ≤ z2). It is
profitable for firm 1 to invest in such an area z1 ∈ [0, z2] iff piN,N,O1 (a) − piO,N,O1 (a) ≥ z1.
The same reasoning applies when firm 1 decides to cover an area z1 where firm 2 has not
rolled out the fiber network (i.e., z1 > z2). It is profitable for firm 1 to invest in this area
iff piN,O,O1 (a) − piO,O,O1 (a) ≥ z1. Let zc1 and zm1 be defined as the highest value of z1 that
satisfy these two inequalities, respectively. We thus have zc1 =
(
piN,N,O1 (a)− piO,N,O1 (a)
)
and zm1 =
(
piN,O,O1 (a)− piO,O,O1 (a)
)
.
Given the above profit functions we can now write the respective reaction functions
of the firms:
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zBR2 (z1) =
{
zm2 if z1 ≤ ẑ1
zc2 if z1 > ẑ1 , (4)
where the threshold ẑ1 is defined as the lowest z1 such that Π2 (z1, zc2) ≥ Π2 (z1, zm2 ),
i.e. the lowest level of the incumbent operator’s coverage that makes the cable entrant’s
profit in the areas with competing NGA infrastructures equal to or above the cable
entrant’s profit in monopoly NGA areas.
Considering that zm1 > zc1, firm 1’s best response function is obtained in a similar way:
zBR1 (z2) =
{
zm1 if z2 ≤ ẑ2
zc1 if z2 > ẑ2 , (5)
where ẑ2 ∈ [zc2, zm2 ].
The incumbent and the cable operator’s best-response functions (4) and (5) decrease
(weakly) with the coverage of the rival, implying that the investment decisions are strate-
gic substitutes. From (4) and (5), one can also see that the model yields multiple equilibria
defined by all couples (zm1 , zc2) and (zc1, zm2 ). This means that either of the firms will be an
investment leader and act as a monopolist NGA provider in some areas characterized by
intermediate investment costs (monopoly areas). In areas where the investment costs are
low enough, both the incumbent and the cable operators will invest in NGA networks.
Investment in these duopoly areas will be driven by the follower’s incentive to duplicate
the NGA network of the leader. Finally, in the highest cost areas no fiber networks will
be deployed; these areas will be served by the old legacy networks.
It is now possible to determine the impact of the access price a on the firms’ in-
vestment decisions. When the cable entrant is the leader in terms of fiber network
coverage (i.e. the equilibrium is (zc1, zm2 )), the impact of the access price is given by
dzc1/da =
(
dpiN,N,O1 (a)
da
− dpiO,N,O1 (a)
da
)
and dzm2 /da =
(
dpiO,N,O2 (a)
da
− dpiO,O,O2 (a)
da
)
. When the in-
cumbent is the leader (i.e. the equilibrium is (zm1 , zc2)), the impact of the access price is
dzc2/da =
(
dpiN,N,O2 (a)
da
− dpiN,O,O2 (a)
da
)
and dzm1 /da =
(
dpiN,O,O1 (a)
da
− dpiO,O,O1 (a)
da
)
.
Thus, the investment decision by the fixed incumbent is affected by two countervailing
effects: the retail-migration and the wholesale revenue effect. The former is given by
dpiN,l,O1 (a) /da ≥ 0, l = N,O and means that a higher access price inflates the telecom
entrant’s costs and thus the retail prices of legacy-network-based services. This makes
it easier for the incumbent operator to migrate consumers to new services based on the
NGA infrastructure. The latter effect, given by dpiO,l,O1 (a) /da ≥ 0, l = N,O, measures
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the effect of the access price on the incumbent operator’s opportunity cost of moving
consumers to the new infrastructure; the higher the access price the higher the wholesale
revenues from renting the legacy infrastructure and thus the opportunity cost of moving
to the new infrastructure. This result corroborates a similar result obtained in the absence
of the cable entrant in BCD (2012).
The key novelty of our model comes from the cable investment decision: a higher
access price a by inflating the telecom entrant’s costs not only helps the incumbent, but
also the cable operator’s profit from NGA-based services (dpi
k,N,O
2 (a)
da
≥ 0, k = N,O), thus
boosting its incentives to invest in fiber. This effect is indeed similar to the retail migration
effect found for the incumbent. However, investment in fiber comes at an opportunity
cost given by the retail profit lost from legacy-network-based services. When the telecom
entrant faces a cost disadvantage due to a higher access price, the retail prices for legacy-
network-based services are higher and so is the opportunity cost of investing in fiber
network for the cable entrant. This effect, measured by dpi
k,O,O
2 (a)
da
≥ 0, k = N,O, which
we label the business stealing effect, counterbalances the previous one. Thus, similarly
as for the incumbent, the overall effect of an increase in the access price a on the cable
entrant’s incentive to invest is ambiguous and depends on the balance between these two
countervailing effects.
3.3 Extension 1: An investment leading cable firm with partial
coverage
In the benchmark model, we assumed that the cable entrant, when present in the market,
has its own legacy network rolled-out over the entire country. However, it might be that,
even in those countries where cable entrants are present, cable coverage is not full.7 In
this section we extend our benchmark model to account for the possibility that a cable
entrant’s legacy infrastructure only partially covers the country. We further assume that
the cable operator does not seek access to the incumbent copper infrastructure.8
As shown in the previous section, two cases can emerge: either the incumbent operator
7Indeed, a recent report of the Association of European National Regulators - states that "[...] while
upgrades have been made to existing coax cables, there has only been minimal increase in extending the
footprint of cable coverage in recent years. Cable coverage in other Member States is generally limited
to dense urban areas and, to a lesser extent, to some suburban or semi-urban areas. There is very little
non-urban presence in most countries" (BEREC, 2016, pp. 12-13).
8We have contacted Cable Europe, an association of European cable companies, and received a
confirmation of this assumption. Cable companies that seek to extend their coverage would rather do it
by acquiring another firm or building the fiber infrastructure anew, if at all.
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dominates in the NGA coverage or the cable entrant does. In this extension, we focus on
the latter case, which is more common in our data and thus more representative for the
EU countries. In this case, the cable entrant dominates the NGA market by investing
more than the telecom incumbent operator, i.e. zm2 > zc1.
Assume first that the cable entrant’s partial coverage is larger than the monopoly
NGA coverage, that is ẑ > zm2 . The cable entrant’s profit is then:
Π2 (z1, z2) = −z
2
2
2 +z1pi
N,N,O
2 (a) + (z2 − z1) piO,N,O2 (a) + (ẑ − z2) p̂iO,O,O2 (a).
It is composed of the profit in the duopolistic fiber areas, z1piN,N,O2 (a), the profit in
the monopolisitc fiber areas, (z2 − z1)piO,N,O2 (a), and the profit in areas where the cable
entrant uses its legacy network up to the maximum coverage, (ẑ − z2) p̂iO,O,O2 (a).
The incumbent operator’s profit instead is given by:
Π1 (z1, z2) = −z
2
1
2 +z1pi
N,N,O
1 (a)+(z2 − z1) piO,N,O1 (a)+(ẑ − z2) p̂iO,O,O1 (a)+(z − ẑ) piO,.,O1 (a),
where piO,.,O1 (a) is the per area profit in all uncovered areas by the cable entrant, i.e.,
where only the incumbent operator and the telecom entrant compete at the retail level.
As before, firm 1’s optimal investment level is given by z1 = zc1 =
(
piN,N,O1 (a)− piO,N,O2 (a)
)
and the total coverage is given by z2 = zm2 =
(
piO,N,O2 (a)− p̂iO,O,O2 (a)
)
. Thus, the equi-
librium found in the benchmark model remains almost unchanged. The cable entrant’s
optimal NGA investment is not affected, even though it does not derive any profit from
its legacy-network-based cable service in the uncovered areas.
A more interesting case of partial coverage is when ẑ2 < ẑ ≤ zm2 . Per Assumption 1,
using the new technology generates more profit than using the old one (i.e. piO,N,O2 (.) ≥
p̂iO,O,O2 (.)), so the cable entrant will invest more and its fiber network coverage will be
larger than its legacy network coverage. As a result the cable entrant’s profit becomes:
Π2 (z1, z2) = −z
2
2
2 +z1pi
N,N,O
2 (a) + (z2 − z1)piO,N,O2 (a).
Firm 1’s profit is:
Π1 (z1, z2) = −z
2
1
2 + z1pi
N,N,O
1 (a) + (z2 − z1) piO,N,O1 (a) + (z − z2) piO,.,O1 (a)
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In this case, the equilibrium is z1 = zc1 =
(
piN,N,O1 (a)− piO,N,O2 (a)
)
, as in the benchmark
case, and z2 = zm2 =
(
piO,N,O2 (a)
)
. The cable entrant’s investment, hence the total
coverage, is in this case positively influenced by a due to the retail level migration effect.
The above case assumes that the investment cost is continuous and increasing in
z. This assumption may not reflect the real market conditions, though. Because of
substantially higher investment costs, cable operators typically do not roll out NGA
infrastructure in the areas previously uncovered by the cable TV network, as dicussed
in section 4.2 on the stylized facts regarding NGA networks in Europe. If we take this
into account and assume that the investment cost function is discontinuous in ẑ, i.e.
c(z) = +∞ for z ∈ (ẑ, z], the equilibrium will change in an important way. Per eq.
(5), the incumbent operator’s best response in this case is to choose investment level
zc1 whenever z2 > ẑ2, so the cable entrant will stay the investment leader, but will not
achieve NGA coverage equal to zm2 because of the binding constraint ẑ. Instead, the
cable entrant’s equilibrium investment will be to cover all possible areas with NGA given
the constraint, i.e. it will choose z2 = ẑ. Because in this equilibrium z2 = ẑ ≤ zm2 =(
piO,N,O2 (a)− piO,O,O2 (a)
)
, any change to a, if it causes zm2 to decrease by an amount small
enough, or to increase, will leave equilibrium cable investment z2 = ẑ unchanged. Thus,
partial cable coverage may render cable NGA investment insensitive to the access charge
a when the investment costs dramatically increase in the areas previously uncovered by
the legacy cable network.
3.4 Extension 2: Regulated access to fiber
As another extension to the benchmark model, we allow that the incumbent is obliged
to grant access to its new fiber infrastructure at the regulated access price a˜. We assume
that the cable entrant is not subject to the same access obligation.9 Because the telecom
entrant is passive by assumption, i.e., it does not invest in its own fiber network, it will
have the option to either seek mandated access to the fiber network and provide higher
quality internet services, or seek mandated access to the legacy network and provide lower
quality internet services. We additionally assume that wherever the incumbent’s NGA
network is available, the telecom entrant would seek access to fiber. We further extend
Assumption 3(iii) by assuming that the cable entrant never seeks access to the incumbent
9This is consistent with the current application of the EU regulatory framework in most member
states.
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operator’s legacy and fiber networks.
The access price to fiber satisfies a˜ < arg max piN,N,N(a˜)), which means that it is below
the level of the access price that would maximize the incumbent operator’s profits in the
areas covered by its NGA network (and by the cable entrant’s NGA network). Given this
extension of the benchmark model, the cable entrant’s profit becomes:
Π2 (z1, z2) = −z
2
2
2 +

z2pi
N,N,N
2 (a˜) + (z1 − z2) piN,O,N2 (a˜) + (z − z1) piO,O,O2 (a)
if z2 ≤ z1
z1pi
N,N,N
2 (a˜) + (z2 − z1) piO,N,O2 (a) + (z − z2)piO,O,O2 (a)
if z2 > z1
,
where piN,N,N2 (a˜) is the per area profit of the cable entrant where it invests in its own
fiber network and the telecom entrant rents the incumbent operator’s fiber infrastructure,
while piN,O,N2 (a˜) is the per area profit where, unlike the incumbent, the cable operator
does not invest and uses its legacy infrastructure instead. Note that an increase of the
access charge a˜ will–by increasing the telecom entrant’s cost–lead to higher retail prices
in the higher quality internet access market; in turn, this will increase profit for the cable
entrant, which provides lower quality internet access using its legacy network. We thus
have dpi
N,O,N
2 (˜a)
da˜
≥ 0.
The optimal coverage conditions for the cable entrant are zc2(a˜) =
(
piN,N,N2 (a˜)− piN,O,N2 (a˜)
)
and zm2 (a) =
(
piO,N,O2 (a)− piO,O,O2 (a)
)
. From zc2(a˜) we observe that an increase in a˜ has
two effects: a higher access charge a˜ increases the cable entrant’s profit in covered areas,
i.e., piN,N,N2 (a˜), because an increase in a˜ relaxes the retail price competition by inflating
the cost for the telecom entrant. At the same time, an increase in a˜ also increases the
cable entrant’s profit in areas covered by the incumbent’s fiber network only where the
cable entrant uses the legacy infrastructure (piN,O,N2 (a˜)), as explained above. The overall
impact of a˜ on the cable entrant is thus ambiguous in case the cable entrant is the
investment follower.
In contrast, when the cable entrant is the investment leader, its fiber investments do
not depend on a˜. This follows from the assumption that access to the cable entrant’s
network is not regulated.10
For the incumbent operator, the profit function is given by:
10The cable entrant’s investment in this case still depends on a, the access price to the incumbent
operator’s legacy network, in exactly the same way as in the benchmark model.
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Π1 (z1, z2) = −z
2
1
2 +

z1pi
N,N,N
1 (a˜) + (z2 − z1) piO,N,O1 (a) + (z − z2) piO,O,O1 (a)
if z1 ≤ z2
z2pi
N,N,N
1 (a˜) + (z1 − z2) piN,O,N1 (a˜) + (z − z1) piO,O,O1 (a)
if z1 > z2
. (6)
The optimal coverage conditions for the incumbent operator are zc1 =
(
piN,N,N1 (a˜)− piO,N,O1 (a)
)
and zm1 (a˜) =
(
piN,O,N1 (a˜)− piO,O,O1 (a)
)
. Note here that an increase of a˜ positively affects
the profit that the incumbent operator obtains in areas where it has invested (piN,N,N1 (a˜)
and piN,O,N1 (a˜)). This implies that an increase in the fiber access price unambiguously
leads the incumbent operator to expand the areas covered by its NGA network. Moreover,
the regulated access price is expected to be lower than the access price that the incumbent
operator would set in the absence of regulation; such optimal (for the incumbent opera-
tor) access price a˜ would further increase piN,N,N1 (a˜) as well as piN,O,N1 (a˜). In other words,
the presence of access regulation for fiber infrastructure lowers the incumbent operator’s
incentives to expand NGA coverage.11
3.5 Extension 3: The impact of asymmetry in investment costs
In this section we extend the benchmark model by allowing the fiber deployment costs
to differ across firms. For simplicity, we disregard the passive telecom entrant in this
extension. Further, the cable entrant never seeks access to the incumbent operator’s
copper network, because it has full coverage of the country with its own legacy network.
The access price a is thus not relevant and dropped in this section.
To analyze how the difference in costs affects investment equilibria, we modify the
marginal costs of fiber infrastructure deployment as follows: c (z1) = z1 and c (z2) =
z2 − ∆. This implies that for the same level of coverage, i.e. z1 = z2, one of the two
firms faces a lower marginal cost to deploy the network; the parameter ∆ represents the
(marginal) cost advantage.12
Given this cost asymmetry, the profit functions of the incumbent and cable operator
become:
11This results complements a similar one in Bourreau et al. (2014), who also point out the detrimental
effect of fiber regulation on the incentives to invest.
12Given current NGA technologies, cable operators can upgrade their legacy networks at a lower cost
than telecom incumbent operators(see, e.g., Taga et al., 2009), which implies that ∆ > 0. We thus
maintain this assumption.
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Π1 = −z
2
1
2 +
{
z1pi
N,N
1 + (z2 − z1) piO,N1 + (z − z2) piO,O1 if z1 ≤ z2
z2pi
N,N
1 + (z1 − z2) piN,O1 + (z − z1) piO,O1 if z1 > z2
Π2 = −(z2 −∆)
2
2 +
{
z2pi
N,N
2 + (z1 − z2) piN,O2 + (z − z1) piO,O2 if z2 ≤ z1
z1pi
N,N
2 + (z2 − z1) piO,N2 + (z − z2) piO,O2 if z2 > z1
.
And the best responses of the two are:
Incumbent firm Cable firm
zc1 =
(
piN,N1 − piO,N1
)
for z2 > ẑ2 zc2 =
(
piN,N2 − piN,O2
)
+ ∆ for z1 > ẑ1
zm1 =
(
piN,O1 − piO,O1
)
for z2 ≤ ẑ2 zm2 =
(
piO,N2 − piO,O2
)
+ ∆ for z1 ≤ ẑ1
The equilibria remain the same as in the benchmark model, i.e., we have multiple
equilibria given by all couples (zm1 , zc2) and (zc1, zm2 ). When ∆ is positive, however, more
areas are covered by the cable entrant (i.e., zm2 and zc2 increase). Hence, the cost advantage
induces the cable entrant to invest more than the incumbent operator. These equilibria
are shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: Best response functions of the model with cost asymmetry
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Moreover, the cable entrant’s cost advantage has an additional effect on the threshold
level ẑ1. Recall that ẑ1 is defined as the lowest z1 such that Π2 (z1, zc2) ≥ Π2 (z1, zm2 ).
Since zc2 > zc2 and zm2 > zm2 and the profit of firm 2 increases with both, while it decreases
with z1, the new threshold ẑ1 also shifts outward, as shown in figure 1. This implies that,
when the cost advantage ∆ is high enough, then ẑ1 increases so that ẑ1 > zm1 . When this
happens, the incumbnet operator cannot be the investment leader any longer, instead
the cable entrant will be the only leader in equilibrium. Hence, once we allow the cable
entrant to have a cost advantage, the more likely equilibrium of the investment game
becomes (zc1, zm2 ).
3.6 Testable hypotheses
Results obtained from the above model and its extensions provide us with a set of testable
hypotheses on the strategic interaction of firms in the NGA market and the impact of
access regulation on infrastructure investments.
3.6.1 Strategic reaction to rival’s investment.
Because of the multiplicity of equilibria in our model, the impact of cable (incumbent)
operator’s investment on incumbent (cable) operator’s investment is not straightforward.
If the firms coordinate on a particular equilibrium, for instance, due to a significant
deployment cost asymmetry, then we expect no impact; the investments of cable and
incumbent operators will be neither strategic substitutes nor strategic complements. If
the firms do not coordinate, then the investments will be (weak) strategic substitutes.
3.6.2 The impact of mandated access to the legacy network on incumbent
telecom operator’s investment.
The impact of access price a on the investment incentives of the incumbent operator is
ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of the retail-migration and the wholesale
revenue effects. When the former (latter) dominates, the impact of a on investment is
expected to be positive (negative).
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3.6.3 The impact of mandated access to the legacy network on cable en-
trant’s investment.
The impact of access price a on the investment incentives of the cable entrant is similar
to that of the incumbent operator in the case when the cable entrant fully covers the
country with its own legacy network. In this case the impact of a depends on the relative
strength of the retail-migration and the business stealing effects. When the former (latter)
dominates, the impact of a on investment is expected to be positive (negative).
When the cable entrant does not fully cover the country with its legacy network (and
the cost of deploying the NGA network in these uncovered areas is prohibitively high),
the cable entrant’s investment incentives may be insensitive to a. Thus, the lack of an
effect of a on the cable entrant’s investment can be explained by the retail-migration and
business stealing effects cancelling each other out, or by the limited cable coverage.
3.6.4 The impact of mandated access to the NGA network on incumbent
telecom operator’s investment.
The impact of access price a˜ on the investment incentives of the incumbent operator is
unambiguously positive. Hence, a less stringent fiber access regulation (i.e. a higher
access price or lack of regulation) incentivizes the incumbent operator to invest more in
its NGA network.
3.6.5 The impact of mandated access to the NGA network on cable entrant’s
investment.
The impact of access price a˜ on the investment incentives of the cable entrant is positive
only in case the cable entrant is the investment follower. In case the cable entrant is the
investment leader, it is insensitive to a˜. Thus, a less stringent fiber access regulation (i.e.
a higher access price or lack of regulation) incentivizes the cable entrant to invest more
only when it is a follower in NGA deployment, otherwise it has no effect.
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4. Empirical analysis
In order to test these theoretical predictions, we estimate an empirical model of the
incumbent and cable operators’ NGA investment using firm-level panel data for 27 EU
member states from 2004 to 2014. Before presenting the regression analysis, we report
the trends in NGA networks deployment across Europe and discuss how they interact
with our theoretical model.
4.1 Data
The data on NGA infrastructure investment have been collected from FTTH Council
Europe, which provides the number of NGA lines (on an annual basis) separately for
incumbent operator and a group of entrants in each member state. While there is only
one telecom incumbent operator in each member state, there are typically several entrants,
such as the cable and alternative telecom operators, as well as other organizations (e.g.
public utilities and municipalities). By screening various FTTH Council Europe reports
we were able to single out the group of cable entrants in each market. To the best
of our knowledge, no other study has used such data, which are crucial to empirically
test strategic interactions between the incumbent and cable operators, the main NGA
infrastructure providers in the EU.13
The EU Digital Agenda Scoreboard provides yearly data on regulatory measures per-
taining to the legacy telecom network, most importantly on mandated access (LLU). The
information on mandated access to fiber networks across EU member states come from
the notifications of EU member states under Article 7 and Article 7a of the Electronic
Communications Framework Directive (European Commission, 2002a). In addition, we
use data from WIK (2012) and some information provided on request by the Body of
European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC). The advantage of these
country-and-firm level data is that they provide variation in the regulatory measures,
across both time and EU member states, which is not the case for the more disaggre-
13We treat cable NGA infrastructure in each member state as provided by a single cable operator in
our empirical analysis. This is justified for the folloing reasons: First, in most EU member states a single
cable operator serves more than 40% of total cable customers and in many member states even more than
70% (see http://www.cable-europe.eu/ff-ye2014-cable-industry-consolidation/; accessed on January 12,
2017); Second, cable networks’ geographical overlap is almost nonexistent, so cable operators do not
compete with one another, but they always compete with incumbent telecom operator in internet access
provision; Third, cable operators use the same internet access technology and are equally treated by
access regulations in each member state.
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gated data used in other studies, which typically stem from a single country.
The data on intermodal competition from mobile technologies and intramodal broad-
band competition have been provided by Euromonitor, the International Telecommuni-
cations Union (ITU) and the EU Digital Agenda Scoreboard. Euromonitor also provides
data on the number of households and the number of personal computers (PC) in use.
Eurostat provides data on education and construction permits. Finally, the World Bank
provides data on GDP.14 A detailed description of all variables and data sources is given
in table 1. Table 2 provides the summary statistics.
4.2 Dependent variables: NGA infrastructures in Europe
NGA investment by incumbent telecom operators (inc_nga) and cable entrants (ca-
ble_nga) is measured by the total number of deployed access lines per household and
thus represents the supply-side installed capacity, or “homes passed”.15
Figure 2 presents the household-weighted deployment patterns of NGA investments
broken down by country, and firm (incumbent vs. cable) for the period of our analysis.16
It reveals interesting differences both across firms and countries. First, it appears that
the deployment of NGA lines follows a rather smooth curve for the telecom incumbents,
whereas for the cable operators it often suddenly levels off after a period of rapid growth.
This pattern, which we attribute to the relative ease with which the cable operators can
upgrade their legacy cable TV networks to NGA networks, means that they are often
the investment leaders, especially in the middle of our sample period. In a number of
countries, however, the incumbent operators were able to catch up with and even surpass
the cable NGA neworks toward the end of our sample. On average, the share of total
number of NGA lines owned by cable operators in our sample amounts to 32.3% going up
14Whereas the dependent variables are available from 2004 to 2014, all independent variables are
available for the years from 2003 to 2013. Owing to the fact that some values are missing, there are
fewer observations than 270, the maximum number in the period 2004 to 2013 (data on NGA investment
are missing for the Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia and the United Kingdom in 2004,
for Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia in 2004 and 2005; values on broadband access
regulations are missing for Bulgaria from 2003 to 2006, for Romania from 2003 to 2004, for Estonia for
2003, as well as for Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia for 2003;
thus, most of the missing data are due to Eastern European countries prior to their EU accession), and
some 0.8% of all the raw data were calculated using linear interpolation or had to be extrapolated.
15Here, we follow the FTTH Council Europe’s definition of an NGA line as based on one of the relevant
fiber technologies (more details are in table 1). These technologies can deliver access speed required by
the Digital Agenda Europe targets.
16Data for Cyprus, where NGA deployment is essentially zero, and Luxembourg, where NGA coverage
is equal to 2.31 in 2014, are not reported for expositional purposes.
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Figure 2: NGA lines per number of households in 25 EU member states for the years from
2005 to 2014 (Source: FTTH Council Europe)
to 43.0% in 2014. The same numbers for incumbent operators’ NGA lines are 33.0% and
42.8%, respectively. Taken together, incumbent and the cable operators clearly dominate
NGA investment in Europe.17
Second, there is substantial heterogeneity in terms of NGA network coverage across
countries. In particular, cable NGA deployment appears to stop at different levels in
different countries mirroring the differences in cable TV coverage across EU member
states.18 Also, for a given level of cable NGA deployment, incumbent firms’ NGA invest-
ment differs widely. For instance, Germany’s and the UK’s cable NGA networks cover
roughly 50% of households, but BT, the UK’ incumbent operator, covers twice as many
hoseholds with NGA infrastructure than Deutsche Telekom, its German counterpart.
17The remaining 14.2% of the NGA lines in 2014 were due to telecom entrants, public utilities,
municipalities and other entrants, for which we don’t have reliable data. While small on average, these
NGA investemnts are substantial in some countries, such as, Italy, Romania, Sweden and France.
18Cable NGA deployment has been de facto restricted to the cable TV footprint, because cable firms
have focused on hybrid, i.e. coax-fiber, NGA deployment during our period of analysis. See also footnotes
7 and 8.
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These trends in NGA deployment are important for understanding the link between
access regulation and NGA investment. As predicted by our theoretical model, if a cable
firm’s NGA investment area is limited by its cable TV footprint, it may be insensitive to
the mandated access price to the copper lines a (see the section 3.3). We predict the same
for a˜, the mandated access price to NGA lines, when the cable operator is an investment
leader (see the section 3.4), which appears to be the case for a substantial share of our
sample.
4.3 Explanatory variables
Our main variables of interest are regulatory measures that grant entrants mandated
access to the incumbent’s infrastructure. We measure regulations imposed on both the
incumbent’s legacy networks and the NGA networks. The former is captured by the
monthly access price, LLU price, which is independently set for each country by a national
regulator. The latter is captured by a binary indicator variable nga_reg, which is equal to
one in years in which NGA regulations are in force in a given EU member state, and zero
otherwise.19 The expected effects of these regulation variables are given in section 3.6,
which summarizes the testable hypotheses from our theoretical model.
Second, we measure the quality of the existing legacy infrastructure of the incumbent
operator by the number of active fixed landlines in a country, legacy. Presumably, the
higher the number of active fixed lines, the better the quality of existing legacy infrastruc-
ture, the higher the opportunity cost of investing in new NGA infrastructure. We thus
expect legacy to have a negative impact on incumbent operator’s NGA investment. The
impact of legacy on cable operators’ investment may be positive or negative depending
on whether the quality of existing legacy infrastructure and of cable infrastructure are
strategic substitutes, or complements.
Another NGA-specfic cost shifter we consider ismdwell_perm, the number of building
permits for multi-dwelling houses issued in each country. Since the most newly-built
houses are equipped with fiber-optic cables ready to be connected by a telecom operator,
the cost of connecting new NGA lines to such houses are low. If incumbent operator
19These regulations require the dominant operator to provide various forms of wholesale access to its
NGA infrastructure, such as wholesale “bitstream access” or “fibre unbundling”. Both legacy network
unbundling and NGA regulations are imposed on the dominant operators only, which results in an
assymetric regulation regime in almost every EU member state, whereby incumbent telecom operator is
subject to these regulations, but cable and other entrants are not.
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is, for the most part, the firm of choice for such connections, we expect mdwell_perm
to show a positive effect on its investments. The effect for cable firms is expect to be
negative though, because of specific NGA technology they typically use.20
Third, we use a number of country-specific demand shifters in our empirical speci-
fication of the NGA investment equations: basic broadband access adoption, bb_adop,
per-capita, adjusted for purchasing power GDP, gdp_pc_ppp and the percentage of pop-
ulation with secondary or higher education, edu. All these variables are expected to
increase future demand for fast internet access on the NGA networks, thereby spurring
investments by both incumbent and the cable operators.
Finally, in order to account for competition between mobile networks and fixed-line
networks, we use the variable fms, which stands for fixed-to-mobile substitution and
measures the number of mobile broadband subscriptions relative to the sum of fixed
landline broadband subscriptions and mobile broadband subscriptions in each country. In
line with the existing literature we allow the relationship between the level of competition
and investment to be nonlinear by additionally including a squared fms in the empirical
investment equations, without taking any priors as to the shape of this relationship.21
4.4 Empirical specification and identification
The incumbents’ investment equation, which we use to assess the impact of regulation
on NGA deployment, is given by:
ln(inc_ngai,t) = αIi + βI ln(inc_ngai,t−1) + γI ln(cable_ngai,t)
+δI1llu_pricei,t + δI2nga_regi,t +Xi,tΘI + Ii,t,
(7)
where X is a set of cost, demand and competition control variables, as described in the
previous section, the superscript I denotes the coefficients specific to the incumbents’
investment equation (7) and the subscripts i and t denote the member state and year,
respectively. We assume that the error term Ii,t is independently, but not necessarily
identically distributed, thus our estimates are robust to any form of heterescedasticity.
Since we use the logarithm of NGA access lines as our measure of the infrastructure
stock, the estimation results are interpreted as percentage changes, which facilitates cross-
country comparisons.
20Hybrid coax-fiber technologies are not used on the fiber lines deployed in new houses.
21Aghion et al. (2005) make an argument in favor of an inverted-U relationship, whereas Sacco and
Schmutzler (2011) show that this relationship can also be U-shaped.
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Because big infrastructure projects like NGA network investment can take years to
complete in practice, we include the lagged dependent variable, inc_ngai,t−1, as a right-
hand side regressor in (7) to capture a dynamic investment adjustment process, even
though our theoretical model does not explicitely account for such dynamics. Addi-
tionally, we capture the effects of any time-invariant variables, such as the population
density, geographic conditions, etc., which can influence the investments, by including
the country-specific coefficients αIi in (7).
The cable entrants’ investment equation is specified in an analogous way:
ln(cable_ngai,t) = αEi + βEln(cable_ngai,t−1) + γEln(inc_ngai,t)
+δE1 llu_pricei,t + δE2 nga_regi,t +Xi,tΘE + Ei,t,
(8)
where the superscript E denotes the coefficients specific to the entrants’ investment equa-
tion (8) and the error term Ei,t is independently, but not necessarily identically distributed.
The equations (7) and (8) can be interpreted as linearized best-response functions
in our theoretical model.22 To this end, the coefficients on the regulation and the rival
investment variables can be used to test the hypotheses from our theoretical model, as
summarized in section 3.6. The dynamic specification of equations (7) and (8) can also
be empirically tested. If the βs are equal to 0, then there are no dynamics or inertia in
the NGA infrastructure investment. An estimate of the βs between 0 and 1 is consistent
with an adjustment process leading to a steady state, which we interpret as one of the
multiple equlibria in our theoretical model.
The identification of coefficients on the endogenous variables in (7) and (8) is possible
due to specific exclusion restrictions: the lagged level of incumbent’s (entrants’) infras-
tructure is assumed to have an impact on the current level of incumbent’s (entrants’)
infrastructure, but not on the current level of entrants’ (incumbent’s) infrastructure.
Further, since equations (7) and (8) form a dynamic panel data model with unob-
served country-specific effects, we estimate them by applying first-differencing and the
standard Arellano-Bond-type instruments for lagged dependent variables. Additionally,
we apply Anderson-Hsiao-type instruments for other endogenous variables in X. In some
estimations, we also use the Anderson-Hsiao-type instruments for the lagged dependent
variables in order to reduce the total number of instruments and thus avoid the potential
overfitting problem (Roodman, 2009).
22The best-response functions are given by (4) and (5) in the benchmark model.
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Finally, we use two external instrumental variables: (i) the average value of the NGA
regulation indicator in the EU countries (excluding the focal country) and (ii) the per-
capita number of personal computers (PCs) in use. The rationale behind the first variable
is the harmonization process within the EU, which makes it difficult for a single member
state to radically deviate from the regulatory measures undertaken in the rest of the EU.
In essence, the eCommunications framework contains some explicit and implicit rules
to incentivize harmonization and “punish” deviating national regulators by requiring
a stronger burden of proof in the course of consultation and notifications procedures
with the European Commission. The second instrument is meant to capture computer
literarcy and correlate with independent variables such as basic broadband adoption. We
argue that being a “low-tech” variable, the number of PCs is not directly linked to our
dependent variables, which represent the “high-tech”, state-of-the-art internet access.
4.5 Results
The estimation results of the incumbent equation (7) and the cable entrant equation
(8) are in tables 3 and 4, respectively. Columns in both tables differ in terms of the
instrumental variables employed; the first two columns use only the Anderson-Hsiao
instruments and are thus labelled 2SLS, whereas the last two columns use Arellano-
Bond instruments and are labelled GMM. Also, columns 1 and 3 use the endogenous
explanatory variables lagged by two and three periods as instruments; columns 2 and 4
use the endogenous variables lagged by two periods only.
All exogenous variables (i.e., gdp_pc_ppp, mdwell_perm and edu) serve as instru-
ments in tables 3 and 4. Additionally, we included two external instruments: the geo-
graphic instrument for fiber access regulation (nga_inst) and the per-capita number of
PCs in use (comp_pen), as explained in the previous section. The first-stage results for
the incumbent’s and entrants’ investment equations are in the Appendix, in tables A1
and A2, respectively. Partial R2 and F-tests of excluded instruments reported in tables
A1 and A2 demonstarte the strength of our instruments in all first-stage regrssions.
All regressions in tables 3 and 4 pass the standard post-estimation tests. In particular,
the AR(2) test statistics do not reject the assumption of no second-order serial correlation
in the residuals, which justifies the use of lagged variables as instruments.23 Further, the
23The AR(1) test statistics show that there is first-order serial correlation in the residuals, which is
to be expected if the error terms in the original equations (7) and (8) are not serially correlated.
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Sargan and the Hansen tests do not reject the assumption of the exogeneity of employed
instruments in our regressions. The difference-in-Hansen tests do not reject the exogeneity
of the external instruments either.
The estimated coefficients are consistent across columns, but the estimates obtained
using Arellano-Bond instruments generally show more statistical significance. In all spec-
ifications, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is positive, but smaller than
one, and highly significant, which means that the NGA infrastructure stock is subject
to significant inertia, as expected. Interestingly, the coefficient on the lagged dependent
variable is consistently lower in all specifications of table 4, as compared with table 3. Ac-
cordingly, the speed of adjustment, 1−β, is higher for the cable entrants indicating faster
convergence towards the long-run, desired infrastructure stock. This aligns well with the
observation that the costs of NGA deployment is substantially lower for technologies used
by the cable entrants, as explained in section 4.2.
Among the control variables, basic broadband adoption (bb_adop) is consistently posi-
tive and significant across all specifications in table 3, as is per capita GDP (gdp_pc_ppp),
as expected. The competition from mobile networks, as captured by the variables fms and
fms2, also shows a mostly significant impact on the incumbent’s NGA investments, in
line with the existing litarature.24 The coefficient on the quality of the incumbent’s legacy
network is negative, as expected, albeit significant only in the GMM estimations in table
3. In table 4, legacy shows more significant, but positive impact. Thus, cable operators
react to a higher quality legacy network by increasing investment in NGA, presumably
to escape the competition from basic internet access offered by the incumbent telecom
operator. Other significant effects in the cable entrants’ investment equation are due to
mdwel_perm and edu and the direction of these effects is in line with our expectations.
The incumbent operator’s investments are positive, but not statistically significant in
table 4. Cable operators’ NGA investments are positive and statistically significant, albeit
only in the last two columns of table 3. Evidence of the strategic interaction of investments
by incumbent and cable operatorss are thus only found in the GMM estimations for
the incumbent firm’s equation. Still, this appears to contradict our theoretical model’s
prediction, in which the incumbent’s and cable operator’s investments are (weak) strategic
24The magnitude of estimated coefficients may seem excessively large, but in the beginning of our
sample all countries had virtually zero fiber lines (and toward the end of our sample NGA penetration
exceeds 50% of households in many countries). This implies that the increases we observe in (log)
percentage terms tend to be very large.
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substitutes rather than strategic complements. One possible explanation of this apparent
contradiction is an investment race, which may happen if both firms try to tilt the market
toward their preferred equilibrium.25 In fact, our model predicts that there is going to be
one investment leader, which will dominate the NGA market. However, unless the cost
asymmetries are large, the model does not predict which firm will become the leader (see
section 3.5). According to the stylized facts discussed in section 4.2, the cable operators
were often leading in NGA deployment, but the incumbent operators successfuly caught
up with and even surpassed them in many markets toward the end of our sample. Thus,
the stylized facts give some additional plausibility to the investment race interpretation.
This result is also in line wiht the literature on access regulation in telecommunications
using more dissagregated data (Nardotto et al., 2015; Bourreau et al. 2017).
Finally, the regulatory variables turn out to be highly significant in table 3. The
LLU price is positive and significant, which suggests that higher access price, i.e., less
stringent regulation of the legacy network, incentivizes the incumbent firm to invest in
NGA networks. Viewed from the theoretical perspective, this result means that the retail
migration effect dominates the wholesale revenue effect. Also, the NGA regulation is
negative and mostly significant, which is consistent with the prediction of our theoretical
model: more stringent regulation of fiber access disincetivizes the incumbent operator
from investing.
Unlike the incumbents, the cable operators do not seem to react to access regulation:
neither the LLU price nor the existence of NGA regulation is significant in table 4. This
is consistent with our theoretical model and the stylized facts presented in section 4.2.
Cable operatos in our sample are for the most part the leaders in NGA infrastructure
deployment, but their geographical footprint is significantly limited in most EU member
states by coverage of legacy TV networks. Both, investment leadership and limited cover-
age can make the cable firms insensitive to access regulation, as shown in our theoretical
model. Overall, our results imply a negative impact of access regulations on aggregate
NGA investments in Europe.
25This point is similar to Vareda and Hoernig’s (2010) race for preemption, which they find to be one
of the possible equilibria in their model of investment timing.
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5. Conclusion
The theoretical literature on transitioning from old to new telecommunications network
stresses that the incentives to invest in infrastructures differ between the incumbent
operators and entrants. The incumbent operators may invest more in a new infrastruc-
ture when the mandated access price to the old network is raised, but the effect could
also be opposite, depending on the specific demand and costs characteristics. The en-
trants are generally expected to speed up the deployment of new infrastructures when the
mandated access charge to the old infrastructure is high. The empirical evidence from
NGA-related empirical literature indicates a negative impact of sector-specific access reg-
ulations imposed on incumbents’ legacy networks (and related service-based competition)
on aggregate NGA investment. It thus appears that the results of the earlier literature
on telecom markets, which generally indicate a negative impact of access regulation on
infrastructure investment, carry over to NGA investment.
In this paper, we extend the literature on access regulation and investment in telecom-
munications markets in two important ways. First, we develop an analytical model, in
which we allow some entrants to own a legacy network infrastructure, which makes them
more similar to the incumbents rather than other entrants that do not own legacy in-
frastructure. This extension accomodates cable operators, which proved to be impor-
tant providers of NGA infrastructure in the EU, and allow us to formulate theoretically
motivated testable hypotheses. These hypotheses depend in a non-trivial way on the
pre-existing market conditions, such as the extent of the legacy infrastructure’s coverage.
Second, we collect novel data on NGA investment and access regulation, which allow
us to complement and improve the existing empirical evidence. Most importantly, we
are able to empirically study the investment game between incumbent operators and the
cable entrants using precise NGA investment and regulation measures pertaining to both
old, legacy infrastructure and new, NGA infrastructure.
Our main empirical results show that more stringent access regulation to both legacy
and NGA networks discourages deployment of new NGA lines by the incumbent oper-
ators, but leaves the cable entrants unaffected. These results are consistent with the
existing literature, which finds similar effects using investment data agreggated at the
country level (Briglauer, 2015), or a regulation measure aggregated across legacy and
NGA networks (Bacache et al., 2014). Our result that access regulation to legacy net-
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works negatively affects incumbent operator’s investments resolves the theoretical inde-
terminacy of this effect and corroborates Grajek and Röller (2012), who arrive at a similar
conclusion, albeit using a different measure of regulation and a less precise measure of
investments. Grajek and Röller (2012) also find that more stringent access regulation
discourages individual telecom entrants’ investment, a result, which is seemingly incon-
sistent with Nardotto’s et al. (2015) finding that the telecom entrants using LLU access
provide higher speed internet access than incumbents.26 In this study, we further com-
plement existing empirical evidence by showing that cable entrants are not significantly
affected by mandated access. We explicate this non-effect within the framework of our
analytical model. The key assumptions responsible for this are: i) the cost advantage
of cable entrants over incumbent telecom operators in terms of NGA deployment, which
justifies why the firms may coordinate on the equilibrium where cable entrants dominate
the NGA market, and ii) limited coverage of the legacy cable network, which may make
cable NGA investment outside of the legacy cable TV network’s footprint prohibitively
expensive. Both assumptions are in line with the stylized facts about NGA deployment
in the EU.
This study carries important policy implications. Our results suggest that a one-size-
fits-all approach may not yield the best outcomes in terms of NGA deployment. The EU
member states widely differ in the spatial reach of cable TV legacy infrastructure, which,
according to our results, is an important determinant of the role the cable operators play
in NGA deployment. Some countries, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, which used
to have relatively wide cable TV networks, are less affected by the regulation-investment
trade off than other countries, such as Italy and France. The regulators in the former, are
able to harness the benefits of access regulation aided competition, without compromising
all too strong on NGA investment led by cable operators. The regulators in the latter
seem to face a more difficult trade-off. One possible approach for these countries, also
suggested by our results, could be to relax the stringency of access regulation on the legacy
and/or NGA infrastructures, in order to provide stronger incentives for the incumbent
operators and telecom entrants to invest.
Our theoretical model, which we take to data aggregated at the country level, could,
26However, these results are not directly comparable, because, Grajek and Röller (2012) use an ac-
counting measure of investments, while Nardotto’s et al. (2015) infer investments from the service quality.
The studies use also different measures of regulation.
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without much modification, also be applied to more disaggregated, regional-level or
municipal-level data spanning multiple countries. Testing strategic interactions between
heterogenous entrants and incumbents using such data is one important extension that
we leave for future research.
30
Appendix
A. Extension 4: Active telecom entrant
In this section we futher expand the model by assuming that all three players can invest in
fiber. Let zi be the firm i = 1, 2, 3 level of coverage, and therefore of investment. In each
area z, we use the superscripts “O” and “N” for the old (copper or cable) and new (fiber)
networks, respectively. The profit of firm i = 1, 2, 3 in a given area, gross of investment
cost, is denoted by pik,l,ji (.), where k, l, j = O,N refer to the network technology of the
fixed incumbent (k), the cable operator (l) and the telecom entrant (j), respectively.
Since the aim of this theoretical investigation is to provide sound, testable hypotheses,
instead of solving all different subgames, we limit the analysis to the following two cases:
• the incumbent domintates the investment stage; the cable operator is the second
relevant player; the service based entrant is the one that invests less, i.e., z1 > z2 >
z3;
• the cable entrant dominates the investment game, with the incumbent operator as
the second player and the telecom entrant as third, i.e., z2 > z2 > z3.
The two above cases are the more realistic ones with respect to the EU scenario:
indeed, EU data shows that, in the period 2004-2014, in 68% of cases the cable operators
are the leader in NGA investment, while incumbent operators dominate the NGA lines
in 32% of cases. Telecom entrants never hold a leadership position in NGA deployment.
They are active only in a few countries (e.g., Greece and Italy) and they typically are the
smaller operators in terms of NGA coverage.
A.1 The incumbent dominates NGA coverage
Assume that z1 > z2 > z3. Recall that in all areas in which firm 3 does not invest, it
requests access to the incumbent’s legacy network and pays the access fee a. This is not
the case for the cable operator who has its own cable network and thus does not need to
rely on access to the incumbent network for the provision of retail services. However, it
may indirectly benefit from higher access price paid by the telecom-based rival. Finally,
we assume that the cable operator is not obliged to provide access to its own network;
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hence, the telecom entrant can only access the incumbent’s legacy infrastructure. In this
scenario the profit functions of the three firms are the following:
Π1 = −z
2
1
2 + z3pi
N,N,N
1 + (z2 − z3) piN,N,O1 (a) + (z1 − z2) piN,O,O1 (a) +
+ (z − z1)piO,O,O1 (a)
Π2 = −z
2
2
2 +z3pi
N,N,N
2 + (z2 − z3) piN,N,O2 (a) + (z1 − z2)piN,O,O2 (a) +
+ (z − z1)piO,O,O2 (a)
Π3 = −z
2
3
2 + z3pi
N,N,N
3 + (z2 − z3) piN,N,O3 (a) + (z1 − z2) piN,O,O3 (a) +
+ (z − z1)piO,O,O3 (a)
In equilibrium, we have a part of the country in which all three players will invest in
fiber (denoted with z3 = zt3 ), another part in which only two player (the incumbent and
the cable operator) will invest (denoted with z2 = zd2) and finally a monopoly NGA area
in which only the incumbent invests (z1 = zm1 ). In all areas z − zm1 no firm will invest in
fiber. The threshold levels are defined as follows:
zm1 → ∂Π1
∂z1
= −z1 + piN,O,O1 (a)− piO,O,O1 (a) = 0
zd2 → ∂Π2
∂z2
= −z2 + piN,N,O2 (a)− piN,O,O2 (a) = 0
zt3 → ∂Π3
∂z3
= −z3 + piN,N,N3 − piN,N,O3 (a) = 0
We can now focus on the role of access regulation to incumbent operator’s legacy
network for investment in fiber infrastructure. We have the following:
dzm1
da
=
(
dpiN,O,O1 (a)
da
− dpi
O,O,O
1 (a)
da
)
dzd2
da
=
(
dpiN,N,O2 (a)
da
− dpi
N,O,O
2 (a)
da
)
dzt3
da
= −dpi
N,N,O
3 (a)
da
> 0
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As in BDC (2012), investment by the incumbent operator again depends on two
countervailing effects: the retail migration effect, dpi
N,O,O
1 (a)
da
, and the wholesale revenues
effect, dpi
O,O,O
1 (a)
da
; that is, the same effect as before but in a more intensively competitive
situation (i.e., larger number of investing firms). As long as the first effect prevails over
the second, an increase in the access charge, a, positively affects the incumbent’s decision
to invest. The telecom entrant’s investment decision is positively affected by the access
charge due to the replacement effect: higher access charge increases its opportunity cost
of remaining on the old network instead of migrating to the new one. Regarding the
cable investment decision, as before, a higher access price a inflates the telecom entrant’s
costs, thus increasesing the retail profit of cable operator (dpi
N,N,O
2 (a)
da
> 0) and boosting
its incentives to invest in fiber. However, this effect is counterbalenaced by the business
stealing effect, the increased opportunity cost of moving to fiber when the profit from
legacy-network-based internet access services increases due to the telecom entrant’s cost
disadvantage. Thus, the final effect of an increase in the access price a on the incentive
to invest of both the incumbent and the cable entrant is not clear a priori and depends
on the interplay between two countervailing effects.
A.2 The cable operator dominates the NGA coverage
Assume now that z2 > z1 > z3. In this scenario the profit functions of the three firms are
the following:
Π1 = −z
2
1
2 + z3pi
N,N,N
1 + (z1 − z3) piN,N,O1 (a) + (z2 − z1) piO,N,O1 (a) +
+ (z − z2)piO,O,O1 (a)
Π2 = −z
2
2
2 +z3pi
N,N,N
2 + (z1 − z3) piN,N,O2 (a) + (z2 − z1)piO,N,O2 +
+ (z − z2)piO,O,O2 (a)
Π3 = −z
2
3
2 + z3pi
N,N,N
3 + (z1 − z3) piN,N,O3 (a) + (z2 − z1) piO,N,O3 (a) +
+ (z − z2)piO,O,O3 (a)
In equilibrium, as before, the optimal investment levels are given as follows:
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zd1 → ∂Π1
∂z1
= −z1 + piN,N,O1 (a)− piO,N,O1 (a) = 0
zm2 → ∂Π2
∂z2
= −z2 + piO,N,O2 (a)− piN,O,O2 (a) = 0
zt3 → ∂Π3
∂z3
= −z3 + piN,N,N3 − piN,N,O3 (a) = 0
The impact of access regulation for incumbent’s legacy network is the following:
dzd1
da
=
(
dpiN,N,O1 (a)
da
− dpi
O,N,O
1 (a)
da
)
dzm2
da
=
(
dpiO,N,O2 (a)
da
− dpi
O,O,O
2 (a)
da
)
dzt3
da
= −dpi
N,N,O
3 (a)
da
> 0
The investment decision of the cable operator, depends as before on two effects: the
retail migration effect, dpi
O,N,O
2 (a)
da
, and the business stealing effect, dpi
O,O,O
2 (a)
da
. Similarly, the
incumbent’s investment depends on two countervailing effects: the retail migration effect,
dpiN,N,O1 (a)
da
, and the wholesale revenues effect, dpi
O,N,O
1 (a)
da
,. When the first effect prevails over
the second, then an increase in the access charge, a, will positively affect the incumbent’s
decision to invest. Finally, the telecom entrant’s investment decision is positively affected
by the access charge due to the replacement effect.
34
References
Aghion, P., N. Bloom, R. Blundell, R. Griffith and P. Howitt (2005). “Competition and
Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(2):701-
728.
Ahlfeldt, G., P. Koutroumpis and T. Valletti (2017). “Speed 2.0: Evaluating Access to
Universal Digital Highways.” Journal of the European Economic Associaiton, forthcoming.
Bacache, M., Bourreau, M. and Gaudin, G. (2014). “Dynamic Entry and Investment in
New Infrastructures: Empirical evidence from the Fixed Broadband Industry.” Review
of Industrial Organization, 44, 179-209.
BEREC (2016). “Challenges and drivers of NGA rollout and in-
frastructure competition.” (BoR(16) 96). Draft report available at:
http://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/public_consultat
ions/6077-draft-berec-report-on-challenges-and-drivers-of-nga-rollout-and-infrastructure-
competition.
Bourreau, M., Cambini, C. and Doğan, P. (2012). “Access Pricing, Competition, and In-
centives to Migrate From “Old” to “New”Technology.” International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 30(6), 713-723.
Bourreau, M., Cambini, C. and Doğan, P. (2014). “Access Regulation and the Transition
from Copper to Fiber Networks in Telecoms.” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 45,
233-258.
Bourreau, M., Grzybowski, L. and Hasbi, M. (2017). “Unbundling the Incumbent and
Entry into Fiber: Evidence from France.” mimeo.
Bresnahan, T. and M. Trajtenberg (1995), “General Purpose Technologies ’Engines of
Growth’?” Journal of Econometrics, 65(1): 83-108.
Briglauer, W. (2015). “How EU sector-specific regulations and competition affect migra-
tion from old to new communications infrastructure: recent evidence from EU27 member
states.” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 48(2), 194-217.
35
Briglauer, W., S. Frübing and I. Vogelsang (2015). “The Impact of Alternative Public
Policies on the Deployment of New Communications Infrastructure – A Survey.” Review
of Network Economics, 13(3), 227-270.
Briglauer, W. and K. Gugler (2013). “The Deployment and Adoption of High-Speed Fibre
Networks and Services: Why are European Member States Lagging Behind?” Telecom-
munications Policy, 37, 819-835.
Cambini, C. and Y. Jiang (2009). “Broadband Investment and Regulation: A Literature
Review.” Telecommunications Policy, 33(10-11): 559-574.
Czernich, N., Falck, O., Kretschmer, T. and L. Woessmann (2011). “Broadband Infras-
tructure and Economic Growth.” Economic Journal, 121(552): 505-532.
European Commission (2002a). Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic com-
munications networks and services (“Framework Directive”). Brussels.
European Commission (2002b). Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic commu-
nications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive). Brussels.
European Commission (2010). Commission Recommendation of 20 September 2010 on
regulated access to Next Generation Access Networks (NGA). (2010) 572/EU. Brussels.
European Commission (2013). Commission Recommendation of 11 September 2013 con-
sistent non-discrimination obligations and costing methodologies to promote competition
and enhance the broadband investment environment. C(2013) 5761 final. Brussels.
FTTH Council Europe (2015). “Creating a connected continent.” Pre-
sentation held at FTTH Conference Warsaw, Poland. Available at:
http://www.ftthcouncil.eu/documents/Presentations/20150211PressConfWarsaw.pdf.
Grajek, M. and L.-H. Röller (2012). “Regulation and investment in network industries:
Evidence from European telecoms.” Journal of Law and Economics 55(1): 189–216.
Inderst, R. and Peitz, M. (2012). “Market Asymmetries and Investments in Next Gener-
ation Access Networks.” Review of Network Economics, 11(1), article 2.
36
Nardotto, M., Valletti, T. and F. Verboven (2015). “Unbundling the Incumbent: Evidence
from UK Broadband.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 13(2): 330-362.
OECD (2013). “Broadband Networks and Open Access”. textitOECD Digital Economy
Papers, No. 218, OECD.
Roodman, D. (2009). “A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments.” Oxford Bulletin
of Economics and Statistics, 71(1): 135-158.
Röller, L.-H. and L. Waverman (2001). “Telecommunications Infrastructure and Eco-
nomic Development: A Simultaneous Approach.” American Economic Review, 91(4):
909-923.
Sacco, D. and Schmutzler, A. (2011). “Is there a U-shaped relation between competition
and investment?” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 29(1):65-73.
Taga, K., Berguiga, M. and Woo J. (2009). “The Moment of
Truth.” Telecom & Media Viewpoint. Arthur D. Little. Available at:
http://www.adlittle.com/downloads/tx_adlreports/ADL_The_Moment_of_Truth_02.
pdf.
WIK (2012). “NGA Progress Report.” Report commissioned by ECTA. Bad Honnef.
Vareda, J. and S. Hoernig (2010). “Racing for Investment under Mandatory Access.” The
B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 10(1): Article 67.
Yoo, Ch. (2014). “US vs. European Broadband Deployment: What Do the Data Say?”
Center for Technology, Innovation and Competition. University of Pennsylvania Law
School.
37
Table 1: Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Description Source 
 Dependent variables  
   
Log of incumbent 
firm’s NGA lines 
ln_inc_nga 
(Logarithm of) Total number of homes passed by 
incumbent operators with one of the available FTTx 
technologies (FTTx = Fiber-to-the home (FTTH) / 
Fiber-to-the building (FTTB) / Fiber-to-the Cabinet 
(FTTC) / Fiber-to-the node (FTTN); “Homes passed” 
is the total number of premises, i.e. a home or place 
of business; Note that incumbent operators mainly 
deploy NGA lines based on FTTC and VDSL 
technology 
 
FTTH Council 
Europe(a) 
 
Log of cable 
firm’s  NGA lines 
ln_cable_nga 
 
(Logarithm of) Total number of homes passed by 
coaxial cable operators with NGA lines based on 
FTTN and DOCSIS 3.0 technology  
FTTH Council 
Europe(a) 
 
 Main explanatory variables  
NGA regulation 
nga_reg 
NGA regulation including all remedies imposed on 
dominant operator: i) cost-oriented unbundling incl. 
sub-loop unbundling (access to FTTN/DOCSIS/ 
FTTC/VDSL networks incl. virtual undbundled local 
access (VULA)) and FTTH/FTTB unbundling at the 
Metropolitan Point of Presence incl. VULA, ii) cost-
oriented products based on fiber in the access 
network (local and regional wholesale broadband 
access to FTTN/FTTC and FTTH networks);  
NGA regulation is measured as a binary indicator, 
which is equal to one in years in which at least one of 
the remedies are in force in a given EU member state 
and otherwise zero 
 
EC, WIK, 
BEREC(b) 
Price for LLU 
llu_price  
Average total cost (=access price) for full local loop 
unbundling (LLU) in €, which is calculated as the 
regulated monthly fee plus the regulated fixed 
connection fee distributed over three years 
EU Digital 
Agenda 
Scoreboard(c) 
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Table 1 (continued): Variable definitions and sources 
 Competition and other control variables  
Fixed legacy 
networks 
legacy  
Total number of active fixed landlines per 100 
inhabitants. An active line connects the subscriber’s 
terminal equipment to the public switched telephone 
network PSTN lines 
ITU(d) 
Basic broadband 
adoption 
bb_adop 
 
Number of total broadband internet subscribers based 
on access equal to 256 kbit/s, or greater, as the sum of 
the capacity in both directions (normalized by 
country’s total number of households) 
 
EU DAE 
Scoreboard(c) 
Fixed-to-mobile 
substitution  
fms 
Percentage share of the total number of mobile 
broadband subscriptions (with internet access equal 
to 256 kbit/s) to the total number of mobile and fixed 
broadband subscriptions (with internet access equal 
to 256 kbit/s) 
 
ITU(d) 
GDP in PPP 
gdp_pc_ppp 
GDP per capita in current international dollars by 
PPP adjustment; The purchasing power of an 
international dollar is the same as that of the U.S. 
dollar in the United States 
 
World Bank(e) 
Education 
edu 
Percentage of population with educational attainment 
of secondary education or higher, population aged 25 
to 64 years 
Eurostat(f) 
Building permits 
mdwell_perm 
Building permits for two and more dwellings as 
annual index normalized to 100 in 2010 
Eurostat(f) 
 (External) Instrumental variables  
PCs number 
comp_pen 
Total number of personal computers (PCs) in use in 
000 persons in a country 
Euromonitor(g) 
EU NGA 
regulation 
nga_inst 
Share of EU countries (other than the focal country) 
that already introduced  regulations of NGA  
networks 
EC, WIK, 
BEREC(b) 
 
(a) The data are available to FTTH Council Europe members at: 
http://www.ftthcouncil.eu/resources?category_id=6  
(b) WIK (2012), BEREC (2016); Public notifications of EU member states under Article 7 and Article 7a are 
available at https://circabc.europa.eu/faces/jsp/extension/wai/navigation/container.jsp.  
(c) Data is issued publicly available at the following EC websites: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/digital-scoreboard. 
(d) Data are publically available at: http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/. 
(e) Data are publically available at: http://data.worldbank.org. 
(f) Data are publically available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/de/data/database. 
(g) Data are commercially available at: http://www.euromonitor.com/.  
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
 obs mean sd min max 
ln_inc_nga 297 8.530 6.353 0 16.87 
inc_nga 297 1153655.1 2767211.4 0 21170000 
ln_cable_nga 324 6.141 7.033 0 17.03 
cable_nga 324 1389751.8 3436341.9 0 24963580 
llu_price 281 11.87 4.805 5.280 42 
nga_reg 324 0.346 0.476 0 1 
fms 297 74.86 10.35 55 100 
fms2 297 5710.6 1631.6 3025 10000 
legacy 297 1.004 0.336 0.288 1.696 
bb_adop 296 0.449 0.235 0 0.925 
gdp_pc_ppp 297 29584.6 13552.8 7723.4 90789.6 
edu 297 70.37 14.81 21.90 93.40 
mdwell_perm 297 153.8 130.1 12.54 913.4 
comp_pen 297 10342.5 16901.5 108.1 75284.8 
nga_inst 324 0.346 0.366 0 0.962 
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Table 3: Estimation results for incumbent's investment equation (dependent var.: ln_inc_nga) 
 
Regression: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimator_(# of lags): 2SLS_(3) 2SLS_(2) GMM_(3) GMM_(2) 
Lagged ln_inc_nga 0.648*** 0.797*** 0.752*** 0.782*** 
 (3.62) (3.13) (3.62) (3.39) 
ln_cable_nga 0.173 0.328 0.310** 0.390** 
 (0.87) (1.29) (2.18) (2.19) 
llu_price 0.914* 1.064* 0.836** 0.900** 
 (1.69) (1.79) (1.99) (1.97) 
nga_reg -4.302* -5.082 -6.152** -6.886** 
 (-1.83) (-1.62) (-2.48) (-2.42) 
fms -4.494 -9.872** -7.315** -8.442** 
 (-1.33) (-1.99) (-2.55) (-2.54) 
fms2 0.027 0.054** 0.041*** 0.046*** 
 (1.28) (1.97) (2.64) (2.61) 
legacy -3.969 -20.581 -19.898** -22.892** 
 (-0.32) (-1.36) (-2.31) (-2.20) 
bb_adop 30.061*** 37.075** 29.748** 33.149** 
 (2.71) (2.31) (2.48) (2.50) 
gdp_pc_ppp 0.000* 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (1.88) (2.24) (2.16) (2.30) 
mdwell_perm 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005 
 (0.83) (0.80) (0.79) (0.86) 
edu -0.130 -0.244 -0.202 -0.270 
 (-0.81) (-1.04) (-1.31) (-1.56) 
F-test (2SLS) / χ2 (GMM) (p-value)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR1 test (p-value) 0.021 0.028 0.005 0.007 
AR2 test (p-value) 0.746 0.328 0.145 0.115 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.787 0.621 0.475 0.309 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.816 0.256 0.475 0.309 
Diff-in Hansen test (p-value) (excl. instr.) 0.507 0.143 0.525 0.412 
# instruments 18 14 25 19 
# clusters 27 27 27 27 
# observations 185 212 212 212 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) are based on the 2SLS estimator (Anderson-Hsiao, 1981). Columns (3) and (4) are based 
on the one-step GMM-Diff estimator (Arellano-Bond, 1991) and include GMM-style instruments for the lagged 
dependent variable with a maximum number of three lags (column 3) or two lags (column 4). Lagged levels of other 
endogenous variables are used to construct IV-style instruments. Country-specific (fixed) effects are included in all 
regressions. Jointly insignificant year-specific effects are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the country level 
and robust to arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity. t statistics in parentheses.   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4: Estimation results for entrants´ investment equation (dependent var.: ln_cable_nga) 
 
Regression: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimator_(# of lags): 2SLS_(3) 2SLS_(2) GMM_(3) GMM_(2) 
Lagged ln_cable_nga 0.617*** 0.582*** 0.614*** 0.630*** 
 (3.77) (3.74) (3.93) (3.98) 
ln_inc_nga 0.155 0.064 0.066 0.047 
 (0.83) (0.31) (0.33) (0.23) 
llu_price -0.607 -0.643 -0.455 -0.460 
 (-0.84) (-1.52) (-1.22) (-1.22) 
nga_reg 0.033 2.575 1.512 1.499 
 (0.02) (1.20) (0.73) (0.74) 
fms 2.583 5.613* 3.504 3.558 
 (0.64) (1.75) (1.32) (1.27) 
fms2 -0.018 -0.032* -0.021 -0.021 
 (-0.72) (-1.84) (-1.43) (-1.38) 
legacy 14.690 29.120*** 22.523*** 24.317*** 
 (1.24) (3.13) (2.93) (3.03) 
bb_adop 2.908 -15.224 -6.394 -6.323 
 (0.17) (-0.98) (-0.46) (-0.44) 
gdp_pc_ppp -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.33) (-0.66) (-0.38) (-0.33) 
mdwell_perm -0.008* -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (-1.84) (-3.03) (-2.87) (-2.91) 
edu 0.413** 0.504** 0.462** 0.472** 
 (2.00) (2.47) (2.38) (2.39) 
F-test (2SLS) / χ2 (GMM) (p-value)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR1 test (p-value) 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 
AR2 test (p-value) 0.347 0.317 0.349 0.343 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.940 0.944 0.995 0.944 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.606 0.861 0.666 0.444 
Diff-in Hansen test (p-value) (excl. instr.) 0.750 0.861 0.633 0.652 
# of instruments 18 13 21 17 
# of clusters 27 27 27 27 
# of observations 200 212 212 212 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) are based on the 2SLS estimator (Anderson-Hsiao, 1981). Columns (3) and (4) are based 
on the one-step GMM-Diff estimator (Arellano-Bond, 1991) and include GMM-style instruments for the lagged 
dependent variable with a maximum number of three lags (column 3) or two lags (column 4). Lagged levels of other 
endogenous variables are used to construct IV-style instruments. Country-specific (fixed) effects are included in all 
regressions. Jointly insignificant year-specific effects are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the country level 
and robust to arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity. t statistics in parentheses.   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A1: First-stage results for incumbent's investment equation 
 
Regression: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. Variable: LD.ln_ 
inc_nga 
D.ln_cab
le_nga 
D. 
llu_price 
D. 
nga_reg 
D.        
fms 
D.     
fms2 
D.   
legacy 
D. 
bb_adop 
D.gdp_pc_ppp -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) 
D.mdwell_perm -0.005 -0.008 0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.362 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.301) (0.000) (0.000) 
D.edu 0.029 0.340* 0.012 -0.010 -0.074** -10.470* 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.098) (0.185) (0.040) (0.010) (0.035) (5.134) (0.002) (0.002) 
L2.ln_cable_nga -0.013 -0.214*** -0.003 -0.004 -0.008 -0.900 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.029) (0.045) (0.015) (0.005) (0.019) (2.847) (0.001) (0.001) 
L2.llu_price 0.243* -0.082 -0.163** -0.004 -0.018 -2.268 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.133) (0.143) (0.063) (0.010) (0.066) (10.763) (0.002) (0.002) 
L3.llu_price -0.185** 0.088 0.025 -0.006 0.037 5.918 -0.003** 0.001 
 (0.073) (0.157) (0.043) (0.006) (0.038) (6.048) (0.001) (0.001) 
L2.nga_reg -0.119 -0.829 0.434 -0.292*** 0.385 46.492 -0.030* -0.009 
 (0.720) (0.744) (0.310) (0.048) (0.323) (49.008) (0.017) (0.009) 
L3.nga_reg -0.622 0.017 -0.471* -0.038 -0.035 -2.612 -0.000 0.005 
 (0.533) (0.763) (0.238) (0.023) (0.311) (45.231) (0.019) (0.010) 
L2.bb_adop 3.800*** 5.193*** 0.757 0.373*** -0.451 -50.833 -0.001 -0.108*** 
 (1.333) (1.364) (0.746) (0.110) (1.180) (179.66) (0.033) (0.022) 
L2.fms 0.014 0.037 0.034* -0.004 0.096*** 14.999*** -0.002 0.002 
 (0.054) (0.067) (0.018) (0.004) (0.024) (3.719) (0.001) (0.001) 
L3.fms 0.023 -0.018 -0.036** 0.004 -0.022* -3.370* 0.001* -0.000 
 (0.028) (0.040) (0.013) (0.002) (0.012) (1.937) (0.000) (0.000) 
L2.fms2 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.108*** 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) 
L2.legacy -3.399 1.718 1.268 -0.707* -1.665 -371.472 0.022 0.185** 
 (3.327) (5.887) (1.516) (0.349) (2.985) (447.17) (0.119) (0.076) 
L3.legacy 2.267 -3.597 -0.566 0.744** 1.100 250.122 -0.023 -0.135 
 (3.627) (5.947) (1.400) (0.360) (2.757) (412.15) (0.117) (0.082) 
L2.ln_inc_nga -0.204*** 0.094 -0.014 -0.004 -0.004 -0.834 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.067) (0.118) (0.025) (0.006) (0.033) (5.095) (0.001) (0.001) 
L3.ln_inc_nga -0.029 -0.059 -0.001 0.014* -0.021 -2.417 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.034) (0.122) (0.027) (0.007) (0.033) (4.859) (0.001) (0.000) 
D.nga_inst -5.127** 4.909 -0.221 0.120 0.087 7.179 0.010 -0.013 
 (2.402) (3.367) (0.827) (0.290) (1.244) (177.00) (0.040) (0.021) 
D.comp_pen 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.007 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) 
Partial R2 of excl. 
instruments 
0.2803 0.1621 0.2156 0.2300 0.2075 0.2161 0.2235 0.5912 
F-test (15, 26) of 
excl. instruments 
19.95*** 16.01*** 9.65*** 31.04*** 6.57*** 6.65*** 9.42*** 24.80*** 
# observations 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 
Notes: The estimates correspond to regression (1) in table 3. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
L, L2 and L3 stand for values lagged by one, two and three periods, respectively 
D stands for first difference 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A2: First-stage results for entrants’ investment equation 
 
Regression: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. Variable: LD.ln_ca
ble_nga 
D.ln_ 
inc_nga 
D. 
llu_price 
D. 
nga_reg 
D.        
fms 
D.     
fms2 
D.   
legacy 
D. 
bb_adop 
D.gdp_pc_ppp -0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.031** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) 
D.mdwell_perm 0.004 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.486 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.353) (0.000) (0.000) 
D.edu -0.217* 0.027 0.004 -0.011 -0.068** -9.595* 0.002 0.000 
 (0.117) (0.081) (0.028) (0.009) (0.031) (4.824) (0.002) (0.002) 
L2.ln_inc_nga 0.085 -0.222*** -0.013 0.006** -0.051 -7.660 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.053) (0.043) (0.010) (0.003) (0.052) (8.583) (0.001) (0.001) 
L2.llu_price -0.006 -0.251** -0.084 -0.001 0.104 16.487 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.065) (0.105) (0.054) (0.006) (0.108) (17.182) (0.001) (0.001) 
L3.llu_price -0.050 0.115 0.006 -0.007 -0.031 -4.894 -0.002*** 0.000 
 (0.061) (0.106) (0.039) (0.005) (0.072) (11.629) (0.001) (0.001) 
L2.nga_reg -0.101 0.239 0.513 -0.236*** 0.184 15.306 -0.028 -0.012 
 (1.180) (0.473) (0.378) (0.042) (0.401) (60.917) (0.019) (0.009) 
L3.nga_reg 0.252 -0.008 -0.542* -0.039 -0.093 -9.591 0.001 0.004 
 (0.996) (0.560) (0.275) (0.028) (0.362) (55.152) (0.018) (0.010) 
L2.bb_adop 4.995** 1.880 0.388 0.373*** 0.058 30.944 -0.006 -0.097*** 
 (1.962) (1.492) (0.631) (0.101) (1.256) (192.00) (0.030) (0.019) 
L2.fms -0.057 0.102* 0.012 -0.002 -0.138 -23.552 -0.002* 0.001 
 (0.080) (0.057) (0.016) (0.004) (0.104) (17.437) (0.001) (0.001) 
L3.fms 0.048 -0.007 -0.031*** 0.002 0.062* 10.346* 0.001* -0.000 
 (0.038) (0.034) (0.011) (0.002) (0.033) (5.772) (0.000) (0.000) 
L2.fms2 0.000 -0.001 0.000* 0.000 0.001 0.168 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.141) (0.000) (0.000) 
L2.legacy -11.923** 7.560 1.103 -0.509 -3.752 -702.228 0.032 0.175** 
 (5.057) (5.453) (1.612) (0.375) (4.135) (643.23) (0.122) (0.077) 
L3.legacy 10.610** -8.371 -0.255 0.527 4.941 872.925 -0.036 -0.126 
 (4.970) (5.641) (1.497) (0.389) (4.437) (700.57) (0.119) (0.082) 
L2.ln_inc_nga -0.344*** -0.017 0.010 0.003 -0.050 -7.818 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.055) (0.037) (0.014) (0.008) (0.031) (4.643) (0.001) (0.001) 
L3.ln_inc_nga 0.047 0.024 -0.008 -0.010 0.013 1.988 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.061) (0.051) (0.022) (0.008) (0.026) (3.935) (0.001) (0.001) 
D.nga_inst 9.313* 0.414 -0.414 0.079 -2.577 -425.530 0.009 -0.018 
 (5.028) (1.621) (0.849) (0.268) (2.463) (394.97) (0.043) (0.024) 
D.comp_pen 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) 
Partial R2 of excl. 
instruments 
0.3382 0.2419 0.1702 0.2260 0.1377 0.1360 0.2270 0.5745 
F-test (15, 26) of 
excl. instruments 
16.97*** 12.89*** 13.77*** 31.08*** 9.71*** 7.73*** 12.58*** 25.97*** 
# observations 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Notes: The estimates correspond to regression (1) in table 4. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
L, L2 and L3 stand for values lagged by one, two and three periods, respectively 
D stands for first difference 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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